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This study involved 11 discussion groups and 9 individual interviews with 
learners at a high school in Dunoon, the area where apparently ‘xenophobic’ 
violence first erupted, in Cape Town, in May 2008. The study used qualitative 
methods to explore these youths’ perceptions of different groups who live in 
Dunoon, descriptions of how these groups interact in daily community life and 
accounts of what transpired in May 2008. In the research these young people 
described themselves as ‘black’ and Xhosa, using these identities to portray 
local township social and economic processes, in which ‘black Xhosa’ people 
are apparently worse off in terms of education, skills and wealth, in comparison 
to local Somali shopkeepers. Young people also described themselves as 
aspiring to be modern, urban citizens, shopping at malls and speaking on their 
cellular telephones. Participants then proceeded to explain the violence towards 
foreign nationals through a discourse of ‘the attacks happened because the 
people are hungry.’ People may well be hungry, but hunger usually turns to 
violence when a set of beliefs and ideologies exist, in addition to this hunger, 
which indicate that a situation is unfair and that taking action to bring about 
change, is justified. Through the combination of identities portrayed by young 
people in this study- as black, Xhosa and modern citizens- it appears as if the 
discursive justification for the violence- as due to ‘hunger’- was being used 
partially metaphorically, to describe a set of desires: people in Dunoon want 
food, but they are also hungry for televisions, laptop computers and airtime for 
their cellphones. Many of these commodities, which are integral to a modern, 
middle-class lifestyle, are still largely elusive for groups of the South African 
urban poor. This leads to resentment and frustration and may produce violence 
when others in the local environment, such as Somali shopkeepers, appear to 
enjoy these social and economic privileges, to a greater extent.  
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Background and Introduction 
 
‘Us’ and ‘them’: the production of social identities 
 
In May 2008, South African citizens in neighbourhoods across the country, 
attacked, robbed and evicted thousands of people presumed to be foreign 
nationals in a tragic and shameful set of events. In total, 63 people were killed, 
342 shops were looted and 213 shops were raised to the ground; 1384 
individuals were arrested (SAPS, 2008). The violence began in Johannesburg 
and the worst of the violence occurred in this region (see table 6 for a provincial 
breakdown of xenophobic incidents). There were some incidents of apparently 
‘xenophobic’ violence in Cape Town, although these occurrences were muted in 
comparison to what took place in Gauteng. One such site in Cape Town was 
Dunoon, where violence first erupted in this city and where, according to 
Milnerton SAPS Inspector Dell, 20-30 shops were looted, 23 people were 
arrested and 270 foreign nationals (almost all) were evacuated (Dell, 2008, 
personal communication).  
 
In order to understand the intergroup conflict that took place in Dunoon in May 
2008, I will analyse the way in which some young people, in this 
neighbourhood, categorise themselves as belonging to certain groups and not 
others, how these social identities and divisions function in their community and 
how these groups’ positions were understood, by participants, in the context of 
the broader society. These perceptions of self and others will then be used in 
order to analyse the way in which the Dunoon violence was rationalised and 
explained, by the young people in this study. An analysis of these group 
identities requires an initial understanding of how people divide the world into 
groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and how they assess what is fair. 
 
An integral component of the process which may culminate in inter-group 
violence is comprised of the way in which people assess ‘ingroups’, social 
groups of which they are a part, and ‘outgroups’, groups of which they are not 
members. These social groups or ingroups, which people identify with, are not 
neutral; they are laden with emotional and value significance, as individuals 
strive for positive self-evaluations, through group membership (Abrams & 
Hogg, 1990; Reicher, 2002; Stott & Drury, 2000). Social identities are, 
therefore, clarified for individuals through comparisons with other groups, 
assessments of how ones ingroup is positioned in the social hierarchy and 
considerations regarding whether this state of affairs is justified (Abrams & 
Hogg, 1990).  
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When describing the conflict in May 2008, ‘we’-for the young people of 
Dunoon- generally referred to being ‘young, urban, black and Xhosa’ and ‘they’ 
were generally local Somali shop owners. ‘Black’ people described themselves 
as worse off than Somali shopkeepers, who were perceived to enjoy superior 
wealth, skills, education and commercial abilities. In addition, the participants 
strongly expressed the desire to be ‘modern, urban citizens’, leading a lifestyle 
that they imagined to be ensconced in this form of citizenship. These young 
people yearn for a different, imagined lifestyle, one that includes privileges 
inherent in middle-class culture. For example, learners described material things 
like cellular telephone airtime, as a perceived basic need in their lives: 
we are suffering.. there was few shops, so we had to make a line, even 
if we want to buy some airtime, we have to make a line (the day after 
the mass looting) 
 
Airtime has become a perceived necessity for the learner interviewed above, 
indicating the kind of life she wishes to live. All of the learners who I 
interviewed had cellular telephones. This was our method of communication. It 
is in this light that I am interpreting that, although participants explained the 
attacks as due to ‘belly hunger’, their descriptions of ‘who we are’ and ‘who the 
Somalis are’, allude to collective beliefs that go beyond a basic need for food. 
People in Dunoon may often feel hungry and not have as much food as they 
would like. However this ‘hunger’ was also used metaphorically, to demonstrate 
these young people’s desire to become respectable, modern citizens, in the new 
South Africa. It was also stated by participants that the Somalis, somewhat 
illegitimately, have greater access to many of these benefits, due to their 
successful business enterprises.  
 
This point about literal and figurative ‘hunger’ is further illustrated by the fact 
that the people of Dunoon rejected a soup kitchen which was operating in the 
community. Ward councillor Peace Stimela states that the soup kitchen was 
eventually discontinued, because the woman who ran it was “an Arab and 
people complained that her vegetables were rotten”. Another anecdote from the 
research process itself also demonstrates this point about how participants used 
the notion of ‘hunger’. During interviews I offered learners something to eat or 
drink, from the restaurant where I conducted interviews. Only one of the nine 
young people asked for something to eat, the others preferring to drink branded 
soft drinks, such as coca-cola. As one drives through Dunoon, in the evening, 
the streets are packed with informal market stalls selling food. It therefore did 
not appear as if there was a major famine in Dunoon, even if people don’t 
always eat as much as they would like and the majority of people are very poor 
(see census data below). Although participants in this study explained the May 
2008 violence as due to the fact that “the people are hungry” and that residents 
4 
“only took their food, they didn’t kill foreign nationals”, these actions are not 
encapsulated by simple ‘belly hunger’.  
 
Empirical measures of hunger in South Africa portray a mixed picture, varying 
with the particular questions asked and different studies. However, these sources 
do not provide evidence of general food deprivation, on a mass level. The 
General Household Survey (a national survey which unfortunately under 
samples in metropolitan areas), reported the percentages of adults and children 
who said that they went hungry because of a lack of food, during the 12 months 
preceding the survey, as 2% for both of these groups, in 2007 (StatsSA, 2008). 
These numbers had decreased from 6,9% to 2,0% for adults and from 6,7% to 
2,0% for children between 2002 and 2007 (StatsSA, 2008). Respondents were 
asked whether any adult (over the age of 18 years) in the household had gone 
hungry because there was not enough food, and a similar question was asked 
about children (younger than 18 years) in the household. The response 
categories varied from “Never went hungry” to “Always went hungry”. The 2% 
classified as ‘hungry’ above, included those who answered ‘always’ or ‘often’ 
went hungry. The 2002 Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) buttresses these 
findings, with little evidence of meal deprivation in Cape Town. Less than 1% 
of respondents – adolescents aged between 14 and 22 in 2002 – said that they 
ate only 1 meal per day and between 1 and 7% said ‘one or two meals’. Almost 
all (92%) of participants stated that on average they ate at least 3 meals per day.  
Three years later, in 2005, the same panel of young people (now aged 17 to 25) 
reported eating, on average, slightly fewer meals.  Hunger levels rose slightly in 
the 2005 CAPS study which found that 12% of the African respondents reported 
eating only 1 or 2 meals a day (Seekings, forthcoming).  
 
Afrobarometer and the 2005 National Food Consumption Survey (NFCS) have 
both found more evidence of hunger amongst South Africans. Afrobarometer 
found that 40% of South Africans said that they had not had enough food once 
or twice, or more than this, during the last year. NFCS found that one half of all 
households reported experiencing hunger, during the course of the year 
(Seekings, forthcoming).  
 
These different findings may well be due to the wording of the question. The 
GHS said ‘going hungry because there wasn’t enough food’, while the 
Afrobarometer asked ‘how often have you gone without enough food to eat’. 
Also, what constitutes ‘enough’ food is open to interpretation, varying from 
person to person. All in all it seems as if the evidence varies due to interpretation 
of the question and people’s different understandings of poverty and 
deprivation. However, regardless of the actual levels of hunger experienced by 
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the people of Dunoon, hunger only turns to violence under certain conditions, 
when people feel that a situation is unfair. 
 
Research in other contexts has also demonstrated that hunger usually turns to 
violence when people feel that a situation is unjust. Protest action linked to food 
and hunger is often due as much to a moral outrage, as to “rebellions of the 
belly” or “an instinctive reaction of virility to hunger” (Thompson, 1993). For 
example, EP Thompson (1993) demonstrated that in almost every eighteenth 
century food riot, there was some legitimising notion: the people were defending 
traditional rights and customs. The deeply symbolic ritual of the harvest home, 
linked to the seasons and a familiar cycle, was disrupted by new economic 
developments whereby the grain was whisked off elsewhere, to locations where 
it fetched the highest price (Thompson, 1993). Seen within the broader context, 
food riots and violence in eighteenth century Britain were the result of capitalist 
innovation- experienced as exploitation by those at the bottom- due to the 
change from feudalism to a market-based economy. Instead of grain being sold 
in the local market, it was sold where it fetched the highest price (Thompson, 
1993).  
 
Returning to the current study in Cape Town, youth in Dunoon used descriptions 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’, as well as notions of ‘needs and hunger’, to demonstrate that 
their situation is substantially unfair. More historical background on the ‘us’ and 
‘them’, as described by youth in Dunoon, further contextualises the Dunoon 
moral economy and begins to indicate why local people may have felt that it was 
legitimate to loot Somali shops, in a violent manner. 
 
 
‘Us’: Aspirations of the African urban working-class  
 
The young South Africans who participated in this study form part of the 
African urban working-class. This group’s perceptions of inequality and justice 
need to be seen in an historical context, if one is to fully grasp the group’s 
attitudes towards other social groups. The end of apartheid was first and 
foremost the result of the urban working-class doubling in size between the 
1950s and 1980s, producing a cohort of African city dwellers who came into 
contact with radical ideas and yearned for education, housing, urban services 
and political rights (Nattrass & Seekings, 1998). The development of Dunoon 
can be seen within this process. The area is a provincial government RDP 
housing project that was designed to accommodate people from the nearby 
informal settlement of Marconi Beam: an area begun in the 1970s to house 
Milnerton race course grooms, stable hands and their families, who had 
migrated to Cape Town. In 1996 Marconi Beam was home to 5775 people in 
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1343 shacks (McDonald, 2000). After much negotiations and concern from 
surrounding middle-class suburbs about land-value, crime and the destruction of 
the natural environment- due to this informal settlement- Marconi Beam 
residents were planned to be moved to Joe Slovo Park and Dunoon, by the end 
of 2000 (Saff, 1996, 1998, 2005). The process of moving people to Dunoon and 
Joe Slovo, from Marconi Beam, was assisted by a government housing subsidy, 
one that  provided once off support for people to acquire a permanent dwelling 
(Barry, 2006). 
 
According to census data (which should be interpreted with caution as it is now 
eight years old), Dunoon is a very poor township, by Cape Town standards. 
Only 47% of the Dunoon population was employed in 2001. It can be observed 
that all of the African townships have much higher rates of unemployment than 
Cape Town as a whole. Of those that were employed in Dunoon, the majority 
were employed in elementary work (41%), with 17% working in crafts and 
trades, 11% as service workers in shops and sales and 9% working as plant and 
machine operators. 86% of Dunoon residents earned less than R1600 a month 
and a further 13% earned between R1600 and R6400. It is noteworthy that 
although all of the African townships in table 1 have similar rates of 
unemployment, Dunoon residents have the second lowest wages, with 86% 
earning less than R1600 per month and only Masiphumelele appearing to have 
lower incomes. Interestingly Dunoon and Masiphumelele were two of the areas 
worst hit by apparently ‘xenophobic’ violence, in Cape Town. Whilst Cape 
Town’s poor are not poor in national terms, the white population is 
overwhelmingly affluent and the African minority is overwhelmingly poor 
(Seekings, 2005). To put it crudely, therefore, in Cape Town a large degree of 
relative deprivation exists between poor Africans and rich white people. The 
residents of Dunoon fit within the cohort of African people which moved to 
urban areas in the second half of the 20th century, a group which has been 
exposed to a different lifestyle from their rural peers and which has particular 
kinds of expectations, for themselves, in the new South Africa. However, the 






Table 1: Dunoon  Population 
Ethnic Group Male  % Female  % Total  % 
Black African 4056 45 4045 45 8101 90 
Coloured 399 4 512 6 911 10.08 
Asian/ Indian 3 0.03 3 0.03 6 0.07 
White 9 0.1 9 0.1 18 0.2 
total 4466 49 4569 51 9036 100 
 
 
 Table 2: Dunoon Language 
Language Number                % 
English 72 0.8 
Afrikaans 1043 12 
Xhosa 7447 82 
Other African ? ? 
 
 
Table 3: Dunoon education 
Education level of adults age 20+ Cape Town Dunoon 
Grade 7 or less 23 41 
Grade 8-11 38 39 
Grade 12 25 15 
Certificate/diploma with grade 12 7 3 
Bachelor’s Degree 2 0.32 
 
 
Table 4: Dunoon employment and income 
Area % 
unemployed 
% earning less than 
R1600 income 
% earning R1600-R6400 
income 
Cape Town 29 42 41 
Dunoon 53 86 13 
Gugulethu 51 67 31 
Khayalitsha 51 78 21 
Nyanga 56 80 20 
Langa  49 72 25 
Phillipi 59 83 16 
Crossroads 54 84 15 
Masiphumelele 59 94 6 
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Table 5: Dunoon occupations 
Dunoon 
Occupation 
of labour force 
Male % Female % Total % 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 
33 1 12 1 45 2 
Professionals 18 0.78 0 0.00 18 0.78 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 
33 1 21 1 54 2 
Clerks 60 3 81 3 141 6 
Service workers, shop and market 
sales workers 
107 5 144 6 251 11 
Skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers 
54 2 3 0 57 2 
Craft and related trades workers 330 14 79 3 409 17 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
203 9 9 0 212 9 
Elementary occupations 473 20 491 21 964 41 
Undetermined 112 5 56 2 168 7 
Total 1,423 61 896 39 2,319 100.00 
 
Despite these difficult circumstances depicted by census data, many of the urban 
and rural poor were initially fairly understanding of the slow pace of change in 
the new democracy (there are no large, recent studies on this topic). This is 
contrary to popular opinion expressed during the democratic transition, when 
commentators assumed that the ANC would be under great pressure, from the 
electorate, to redistribute wealth (Nattrass & Seekings, 1998). In a survey of 
post-apartheid expectations, Charney (1995) found that the electorate were 
sympathetic to the limits facing government and the constraints that prevent 
government from miraculously solving economic problems. Even though jobs 
were rated as the most pressing problem in people’s lives, the urban and rural 
poor were substantially pessimistic (or realistic) about the extent of possible job 
creation (Charney, 1995). It seemed to be recognised that social and economic 
change is not entirely in the hands of government and that ‘economic prosperity 
for all’ cannot happen in the short-term. There was evidence of disappointment, 
but hope that changes would happen in time. Charney (1995) found that the 
most disappointed were groups of urban people, especially trade unionists and 
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better educated African people, indicating where future resistance and uprisings 
may originate.  
 
Whilst South Africans strongly support the redistribution of wealth, attitudes for 
redistribution are conditional, depending on perceptions of whether the 
recipients are deemed to be deserved beneficiaries of policies that promote 
equality. For example, the elderly and those with responsibilities, such as 
breadwinners, are deemed worthy recipients of redistributed wealth. In a 
synthesis of literature on distributive justice, Seekings (2005) states that 
perceptions and attitudes change according to the questions posed and the date 
of the study. However, in general, the poor to very poor are more critical of 
these inequalities than the well-off and Africans are more critical than whites 
and coloureds. The census data (see p. 5) indicates that Dunoon is 
predominantly comprised of poor African people. The cohort of poor young 
Africans who participated in this study are therefore part of a group which, 
research indicates, is most critical of inequalities (which have actually increased 
in the new South Africa according to empirical data: see, for example, 
Leibbrandt’s calculation of the Gini coefficient for income distribution rising by 
five percentage points, from 0.65-0.7, between 1995 and 2000 in Seekings, 
2007) in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
In summation, the Dunoon youths who participated in this study need to be seen 
within a socio-historical context, one which involved mass urbanisation and 
political transformation, without substantial changes in material circumstances. 
In addition, in post apartheid South Africa inequality continues to rise, yet many 
Africans display patient attitudes towards the ANC government, whose difficult 
task to bring about material change, is acknowledged. However, research also 
shows that the African urban poor are most critical of differences in wealth and 
that attitudes to redistribution depend on perceptions of whether recipients 
deserve to benefit. The question therefore looms as to what South Africans feel 
foreign nationals deserve to receive, in the new South Africa.    
 
 
‘Them’: foreign nationals 
 
Although people may have been accepting of government’s constraints in terms 
of producing economic prosperity for its citizens, it is not, generally, seen as 
legitimate for African foreign nationals to be thriving in the new democracy. In 
one study, 74% of South Africans support deportation of anyone who is not 
contributing economically to South Africa (Crush, 2008). 61% stated that 
foreign nationals should not be able to start a small business in this country 
(Crush, 2008). The illegitimacy of foreign nationals’ economic prosperity is 
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underlined by South Africans’ attitudes towards these people’s rights, in South 
Africa. Excluding treatment for HIV/AIDS, 66% of South Africans expressed 
the sentiment that irregular migrants should be granted no rights or protection, 
including the right to basic services (Crush, 2008). This may be due to the fact 
that South Africans feel that they themselves have not received these rights and 
full citizenship, as service delivery protests indicate. Between 1500 and 2000 
service delivery protests occurred in the 2 year period from March 2004 to 
March 2006, spanning South Africa’s metropolitan areas, including Tshwane 
(Pretoria), Nelson Mandela Metropole (Port Elizabeth), Cape Town and Durban 
(Booysen, 2007). These service delivery protests involved citizens demanding 
the provision of amenities like water, electricity and housing. Booysen (2007) 
concludes that these protests demonstrate dissatisfaction with local conditions 
and alienation from the institutions of local democracy. A memorandum handed 
to the city of Cape Town by Dunoon residents is attached as appendix A. This 
document demonstrates the service-delivery related frustration which existed in 
the area. Dunoon residents- and other poor South Africans- feel aggrieved that 
they have not received services which are assumed to accompany citizenship in 
a democratic state and they do not, generally, feel that foreign nationals should 
have access to these services. 
 
The case study of the May 2008 conflict, in Dunoon, therefore serves to 
highlight that in contexts of relative deprivation, people are constantly assessing 
what they have, by comparison with selected others, in order to assess what is 
fair. People make meaning of their material conditions and the way these 
circumstances structure who they are and their place in the world. The 
frustrations of the South African urban poor, based on a lack of service delivery, 
high unemployment, low wages and feelings that ‘we’ have not attained the life 
that ‘we’ imagined ‘we’ would now be living, partially shape what it means to 
be black, modern, urban and even ‘hungry’, as the pages which follow illustrate. 
In these circumstances sentiments may emerge which, tragically, contribute to 
collective acts of violence, in the process denying others the social and 
economic rights which ‘we’ feel ‘they’ should not attain prior to ‘us’ receiving 
these benefits. The violence in Dunoon is therefore best understood as a process, 
whereby economic, social and political factors are inextricably interlinked in the 
way people in poor communities understand their position. Whilst relative 
deprivation and perceptions of inequality are neither necessary nor sufficient in 
the precipitation of violence, these sentiments are pertinent risk factors for the 
outbreak of conflict. An analysis of the reciprocal relationships and expectations 
that exist between individuals and groups, within the particular contexts in 
which they live, can lead to explanations of conflict which are succinct and 
multidimensional, in so doing enhancing understandings of how intergroup 
violence, in some contexts, may occur.  
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Figure 1: Dunoon Settlement 
 Site 5 Informal Settlement  
   
               Main Road                                             Inkwenkwezi High 
  
Killarney Race Track        Sophakama Primary 
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Table 6: Provincial breakdown of xenophobic incidents 




People killed Arrested 
suspects 
Western Cape 33 2 1 435 
Mpumalanga 44 3 1 49 
Eastern Cape 2 0 1 5 
Gauteng 155 202 54 227 
Free state 5 0 1 97 
Limpopo 0 0 1 63 
North West 16 3 1 298 
Kwazulu Natal 87 2 3 121 
Total 342 213 63 1384 
Table. Source: SAPS 2008 
 
 
Setting, Methodology and sampling 
 
Dunoon is located 5 kilometres north of Marconi Beam and is popular because 
of its proximity to Cape Town’s industrial centre and CBD and the fact that 
there was perceived to be (until fairly recently) less crime and violence in 
Dunoon, than some of the bigger townships (McDonald, 2000). The first erf for 
Dunoon was surveyed in January 1996 and there are currently 3026 erven (email 
correspondence, Blaauwberg sub council). As the formal housing was built, 
shacks mushroomed in the area, particularly along the river and in the area 
known as site 5 (see map)- which is particularly notorious for being a hive of 
criminal activity. Local community leader and councillor, Peace Stimela, says 
that he, together with a construction company, estimate that there are currently 
18000 people living in Dunoon, meaning that the population has doubled since 
the 2001 census data below. Mr Stimela says that it was in approximately 2004, 
that a huge influx of people began arriving in Dunoon, adding to local 
frustrations. The learners and a police reservist, interviewed in this study, 
corroborated this assertion. The area known as site five (see map above), 
emerged in the last few years, consists exclusively of informal housing and it 
can be observed that many of the plots in Dunoon have informal ‘Wendy 
houses’ alongside the RDP houses.  This information buttresses the evidence 
that the population of Dunoon has escalated in recent times, although there may 
well not be as much of an influx as Mr Stimela suggests. 
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Qualitative methodology, in particular informal discussions and semi-structured, 
in-depth interviews, were utilised to excavate the range of attitudes, 
understandings and normative values that are associated with different kinds of 
violence, in Dunoon. I approached the only high school in Dunoon, called 
Inkwenkwezi. The deputy principal was very helpful in agreeing to the research 
taking place during the period of Life Orientation, in which learners are 
supposed to complete a module on violence, as part of the curriculum. In total, 
11 discussion groups and 9 individual interviews were conducted with grade 11 
learners at Inkwenkwezi High. The learners were shown a short documentary on 
the events of May 2008, entitled ‘Baraka’, which is set in Masiphumelele, a 
neighbourhood in southern Cape Town that is similar in demographic, social and 
economic terms to Dunoon. The documentary lasted 20 minutes and the classes 
were then split into discussion groups of approximately 10 learners each.  
 
The discussion groups were facilitated by the researcher and three trained, 
Xhosa speaking fieldworkers. Some of the discussions were therefore conducted 
in English, but most utilised Xhosa as the medium for discussion. Discussion 
groups probed whether the learners agreed or disagreed with the behaviour and 
attitudes of the people portrayed in the documentary, a comparison between 
Masiphumelele, the area in the film, and the Dunoon settlement and an extensive 
dialogue on the events that took place on the week end of 23-25 May 2008. 
Experiences of crime and violence in Dunoon, in general, were also discussed. It 
should be noted that the themes which emerged from these sessions were 
similar, despite using different languages and facilitators, for different groups.   
In the discussion groups learners were asked to give their telephone numbers if 
they were interested in participating in an individual interview. Participants for 
the individual interviews were partly chosen at random, from these lists of 
telephone numbers. I also intentionally chose three individuals, for these 
individual interviews, based on their enthusiastic and thoughtful participation in 
the discussion groups. I conducted the individual interviews in English. The 
learners’ excellent English aided this process. Individual interviews took place 
on benches at a petrol station near Dunoon, or at the Steers fast food restaurant, 
also nearby. Learners were compensated with R30 vouchers for Pick n Pay 
supermarket, in exchange for their participation. The individual interviews 
included informal conversation on the participants’ background, the events of 
May 2008 and general experiences of crime and violence. In addition, 
interviews were conducted with the principal of the school, police officers who 
were present during the attacks, a journalist, community leader/councillor and a 
police reservist, who lives in Dunoon.  
 
Interviews were recorded with digital voice-recorders and then transcribed and 
translated. The material was then analysed using a thorough thematic analysis, 
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looking for themes which appeared consistently in the discussion groups and 
interviews. Material in this paper comes from both the discussion groups and the 
individual interviews. 
 
The census data, table 3, indicates that the learners who participated in this study 
may well be more educated than the Dunoon population in general. In 2001, 
41% of the Dunoon population did not progress further than grade 7, with a 
further 39% obtaining grades 8-11. If the grade 11 learners in this study go on to 
complete matric in 2009, they will therefore be amongst the 20% most educated 
people in Dunoon. The sample is skewed in this way and may result in more 
educated responses from participants. The desires and ambitions of these 
learners may also be greater than the average resident, as these learners could 
realistically use their education to find skilled employment and a higher income 
than the average Dunoon resident.    
 
 
Summary of the key findings 
 
Three main discursive themes emerged from the research: participants described 
themselves as ‘Black/Xhosa’; they explained how they are modern, urban 
citizens and, finally, these youths justified the violent looting of Somali shops as 
understandable because ‘the people are hungry’. I will use analysis from the first 
two themes to argue that the attacks involve more than a simple need for food, 
as stated in the third theme. Even though stealing from Somali shops was 
explained with descriptions of literal ‘hunger’, behind this ‘legitimising 
narrative’ is a deeper set of sentiments related to what a group of the urban poor 
feel that they deserve, especially in relation to others in their environments, 
whose situation is deemed to be somewhat illegitimate.    
 
 
Young people in Dunoon state that they are ‘black’ 
and Xhosa 
 
‘We’, for the young people of Dunoon, was partially based on localised notions 
of being ‘black’ and ‘Xhosa’ and not ‘South African’. ‘Blackness’, in this 
context, was used to explain differences between South Africans and foreign 
nationals, especially Somalis. These differences were based on perceived 
wealth, education, skills and the degree to which people struggle to survive and 
succeed in life. Whilst there was much disagreement as to whether this 
hierarchy, understood in racial terms, was legitimate or exploitative, participants 
agreed that ‘black’ people were less prosperous than foreign nationals.  
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In the research, a ‘black’ racialised identity was consistently used to describe 
different groups of South Africans, even though the term ‘South African’ was 
used very rarely:   
When they say black in Xhosa they say umto umyama, when they say 
umto umyama they refer to Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, Tshwana and all 
those, they don’t refer to the foreigners as we call them. If they say 
foreigners they say people from upper Africa or kweri kweri 
 
In the quote above, ‘blackness’ is used to differentiate certain groups of South 
Africans from people born elsewhere in Africa. The groups mentioned above are 
not referred to in nationalistic terms, but are united around a common ‘racial’ 
identity, including some groups of people who struggled against apartheid. 
‘Blackness’ was therefore often used by learners, in Dunoon, to describe certain 
groups of South Africans, although evidence of a united national identity was 
not apparent. One participant explained the different groups that went to meet on 
the field in Dunoon, before violence broke out, in the following way: 
P: The people all went to the field, the Somalians and the Nigerians 
and the Zimbabweans and the black people and the coloureds, and 
they were discussing about firing the Somalians. To take them back to 
their countries. So when the meeting didn’t start, the people just go 
and break their shops.  
 
Blackness, in this context, refers to groups of South African people who suffered 
under apartheid, but does not include ‘coloured’ people. Somalis, Nigerians and 
Zimbabweans are also categorised as distinct from ‘black people’. Zwele Jolobe, 
states that understanding usages of ‘blackness’ requires a thorough excavation of 
the contexts in which the term is used, starting with Biko. When Steve Biko 
spoke of ‘we blacks’ (an essay contained in “I write what I like”), he was 
referring to all people who are oppressed (Ratele, 2003). However, it is not true 
that black South Africans will ubiquitously refer to themselves as ‘black’ and 
refer to foreign nationals as, for example, Somalis, Angolans or Nigerians. The 
use of the term is contingent to the context, the specific South Africans using the 
term and the historical period (Jolobe, personal communication, 3 November 
2008).  
 
Usages of ‘blackness’ are therefore linked to local factors, such as class, politics, 
economics and residential structure and these social forces shape what it means 
to be ‘black’ (Gilroy, 1995). Writing in a different context, Gilroy (1995) 
describes British race politics as inseparable from those factors mentioned 
above, things which are infused in the inner-city and urban life and often related 
to perceptions of ‘lawlessness’ and ‘criminality’. ‘Blackness’ in Britain is 
integral to the production of urban social geography. In this setting, British 
16 
‘black’ people use colour to articulate urban experiences related to exclusion 
from Britain and Britishness, a diverse experience that differs for people of 
Ethiopian, Caribbean and Asian descent.  
 
Exploring the local Dunoon class, economic, political and residential structures 
sheds light on how ‘blackness’ is used by participants in the current study. These 
local relations are hinted at in the reference to “firing” the Somalis, as if people 
can simply dismiss foreign nationals in the same way that an employer 
terminates an employee’s services. It is the Somalis and not the Nigerians or 
Zimbabweans, who are to be ‘fired’. In Dunoon, Somalis own most, if not all of 
the local retail outlets, possibly generating the most resentment (de Vries, 
Samsodien, Kemp & Bailey, 2008). This metaphorical ‘firing’ is not irrelevant, 
as many of the divisions and tensions between ‘us’ (black and Xhosa) and 
‘them’ (other Africans, particularly Somalis), were described in terms of the 
local Dunoon economy and how it has changed with the influx of foreigners: 
S:  these people have their way of stocking that they are using, but a 
Xhosa won’t know that. It is like the foreigners stock in one day and 
they divide the stock among them. So Xhosas won’t know that okay, let 
us do this so that our prices become less so that we get a nice income, 





O: Somalis put money together and buy stuff for that one, and again 
buy for another one. Somalis are helping each other, and so there is 
no helping each other with black people, they only do for 
themselves....a black person is jealousy when seeing another black 
succeed, so Somalis are not jealousy of each other – they are happy 
for each other when their businesses are succeeding, that’s why their 




N: Black people they don’t know how to make a business, they have 
experience those foreigners, they know how to make a money. 
 
In the quotes above, local business practices are interchangeably racialised and 
ethnicised. ‘Us’ black/Xhosa people are perceived as inferior, in terms of the 
ability to run a small business. This was sometimes described as due to a lack of 
skills required to make minor entrepreneurial ventures successful. A similar 
situation exists in Los Angeles, where one in three Koreans operate a small 
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family business, many of which are located in poor African American 
neighbourhoods (Park, 1996). Korean immigrants have entered into the local 
economy due to low start up costs, social capital, a rotating credit system and a 
good Korean education. This has lead to conflict between these two groups, due 
to different experiences of class and racism, financial opportunities and social 
mobility (Park, 1996). Similar dynamics, between South Africans and Somali 
shop owners, based on perceptions of wealth, skills and education, have also led 
to conflict 
 
The learners’ opinions above indicate that the Somali traders’ success is due to 
their collectivist practices and the mentality of the Somali minority, factors 
which aid them in business, as they are able to buy stock collectively, at reduced 
rates. There was also an emotional dimension to this process, as ‘Xhosas/blacks’ 
were often described as jealous of other ‘black’ peoples’ economic triumphs. 
Ramphele (2002) states that jealousy and distrust are common in Lower 
Crossroads, another poor African township. She states that levels of trust are 
linked to the availability of basic resources; as competition for these resources 
increases, so does distrust. Ramphele (2002) also demonstrates, through case 
studies, how envy and resentment of success demotivate young people from 
transcending the socio-economic environments in which they grow up. 
Similarly, although Bray, Gooskens, Khan, Moses & Seekings (forthcoming 
2010) found evidence of people in Masiphumelele supporting one another 
through informal neighbourly networks, these ties had limits, expressed through 
jealousy, gossiping and accusations. Jealousy and resentment are therefore part 
of the social relations which exist in poor South African townships. The fact that 
it is ‘black’ people who are accused of harbouring these feelings, may be due to 
the fact that they have fewer resources and competition between individuals may 
be more rife, than for shopkeepers in poor areas. It may also be due to minority 
groups, such as Somalis, helping individuals within the group, whereas majority 
groups are competitive amongst themselves. 
 
Learners often referred to their ‘ingroup’ as ‘Xhosa’, in addition to being ‘black’ 
(see the first quote above). This may be due to this population’s shared Eastern 
Cape heritage, where Xhosa is the dominant language. It may also be used to 
distinguish between themselves and other African peoples, differences which are 
substantially linguistic. To illustrate this point, the derogatory term 
“makwerekwere” comes from the Sotho word for ‘incompetent speech’ 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001). The young people may, therefore, call 
themselves Xhosa in order to differentiate between those that speak Xhosa (‘us’) 
and those that cannot speak this language (‘them’).  
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Participants therefore described differences between ‘black/Xhosa’ people and 
‘Somali/foreign’ shopkeepers. These differences were linked to race, people’s 
skills and abilities and were described as embedded in Dunoon’s local economic 
and social life. In this context, blackness was consistently associated with being 
‘worse off’. There was, however, debate as to whether this was due to people’s 
own inadequacies or illegitimate exploitation. Disagreement ensued, between 
learners, as to whether Somalis should be entitled to conduct small enterprises 
within the local township economy and purchase stock communally. The 
following discussion illustrates these different opinions: 
S: I don’t see anything wrong there, if is a Xhosa he can have a 
business ... maybe opening a shebeen here and have a shop there and 
the same person, but if you open that shop you are not going to 
register it on your name so that people know that it is yours, you 
register it with your child or your brother so that in the end ... but with 
Baraka’s they register all their shops with their names, and it is 
known that all those shops belong to him. And that is not a problem 
cause it is his money and it is growing of his business and he thought 
he should open other shops, so I don’t see anything (wrong) 
N: I want to disagree with what Sipho has said. It is not about having 
more money and that a person must have many businesses, but it’s 
about giving everybody a chance so he can be in that position of 
having a business. You cannot be one and own the whole South Africa 
with businesses. 
S: Okay, maybe I give you Nokothula a chance, while I’m giving you a 
chance and you don’t come up yet, and I must wait for and don’t get 
money, keep waiting for you. How many people should I wait for? 
B:  so D what do you say? 
D: People of Masiphumelele were not right because if they had a 
chance that they can have many businesses, they could and not being 
complained for. 
O: They complained because their shops are not running, they are 
supposed to complain. Their shops are not running these people have 
less prices, and they have many shops. 
 
Some of the learners felt that the business practices utilised by Somalis were 
within the ‘rules of the game’. They point out that if a Xhosa person employed 
similar tactics, it would go unnoticed. A notion of individual rights within a 
competitive market-economy is asserted as fair and just, by some learners, and 
these liberties are extended to foreign nationals. Others felt that foreign 
nationals’ economic ventures were unfair and that there should be some kind of 
‘regulation of the market’. These learners expressed concern that the Somalis 
had monopolised the local economy, such that not ‘everybody is given a fair 
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chance’. Following this logic, the rules of the game need to be altered, as these 
learners felt that ‘we are oppressed and suffering’, under the current 
circumstances. This is refuted as not realistic, in the dialogue above, as Sipho 
states that it is not possible to balance commercial practices and the welfare/ 
equality of the entire populace.  
 
It is therefore implied, in the above argument, that some of the learners want 
foreign nationals’ business interests to be monitored, but not those of South 
African citizens. Citizenship comprises more than legal rights that individuals 
are guaranteed by the state; it includes the conditions which are necessary for 
individuals and households to sustain themselves socially and economically 
(von Lieres & Robins, 2008). In other words, citizenship is construed, by some 
scholars (see for example Turner, 1993), as a set of social practices which 
interpolate individuals as members of society and which, in turn, shape the 
distribution of resources to people and groups. This notion of citizenship- as 
related to social and economic rights- was utilised by some learners in Dunoon, 
who felt that Somali business practices were illegitimate because these practices 
negatively shape the structural conditions that South African citizens need to 
thrive. In so doing, these participants claim their citizenship through these 
attitudes and actions, alienating Somalis from ‘our community’. The Somalis, in 
the eyes of some learners, are not perceived as sharing in the same rights as 
black South Africans, such as the freedom to conduct small businesses in any 
manner of their choosing.  
 
This ‘exclusion’ is also apparent from the manner in which the learner refers to 
the Somali shopkeepers as ‘Barakas’, borrowing terminology from the film that 
they were shown, but clearly grouping shop owners in townships as a 
collectivity and not as individual people or citizens of the community. This is 
underlined by the fact that another participant refers to ‘these people’. In the 
minds of these learners there were definitive differences between themselves 
and Somalis, differences that are assumed to be cultural, economic and ‘racial’. 
Somalis are seen as shop owners and ‘outsiders’, not as individuals or 
incorporated members of the local community. These exclusionary sentiments 
indicate why others learners were more militant in their rejection of Somali 
business practices (although it should be noted that this opinion was in the 
minority): 
S: I think that they block for the black people not being able to sell, so 
they make many shops. 
A: I say the reason for the people to complain is perhaps...I’m also 
with Siseko, because people...we also want to learn so that we open 





L: You see that guy is right, because these people I don’t see them 
right people, they must go...Independence here was fought for by our 
parents and they were not here. So why are they running around the 
right place and not fight for their country until it became right? There 
was war even here but we never ran. And look how these people come 
here, they are here illegally. They are right the ones who have permits 
of staying here, but there are those who just came. Listen to that 
woman there she said she had a business, her business ended because 
it is full of these people here. That woman was not suffering, and now 
she got help from the Somali’s the money for rent, but before they 
came she was helping herself. They must leave permanently, they must 
go, alles, I’m talking about all of them. 
 
N: Thabo what do you say? 
 
T: I say they must go because as that woman said she was running her 
own business, but couldn’t continue because of these Somali’s, cause 
these Somali’s when I... it doesn’t seem they are doing the business of 
selling only, cause  they stock in one place with these black people 
who were having businesses before. But they lower prices, it is clear 
that they don’t want gain but there’s ... they are just playing a game 
about these shops... 
 
N: so perhaps there’s something else are they selling? 
 
T: there must be something else they are selling because when they 
pricing their things they are like they don’t buy those things, so they 
are not expecting any profit. 
 
The legitimacy of foreign nationals’ presence is rejected with the rhetoric that 
‘our parents’ fought for ‘our’ independence. The ‘we’ here is clearly linked to 
people who suffered under apartheid and their children who, it is implied, should 
reap the benefits of the new democracy. The ‘us’ and ‘them’ are therefore 
perceived in relation to different national struggles in Africa; not a pan-African 
fight to overcome oppression. It is puzzling that this rejection of other Africans’ 
struggles exists alongside discourses of an ‘African renaissance’ and ‘ubuntu’, 
within the South African context (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001). The boundaries 
of the South African nation-state are therefore drawn in relation to the apartheid 
struggle, illustrating how the South African people came into being through the 
politics and culture of resistance to apartheid, in the form of the National 
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Liberation Movement (Chipkin, 2007). Neocosmos (2006) goes a step further, 
arguing that resistance to the apartheid state, in the form of a National Liberation 
Movement, is directly linked with xenophobia in contemporary South Africa. 
This is due to the fact that nation-building and citizenship, in the post apartheid 
era, are based on historical ‘struggle’ identities, which are exclusionary towards 
foreign nationals. The attitudes displayed by some of the learners in Dunoon, 
such as those quoted above, support this view.  
 
In the quote above there are also undertones associating foreign nationals with 
crime. “They are here illegally” implies all of ‘them’ have broken the law by 
their mere presence. The second learner perceives a more sinister plot, involving 
business as simply a front for other forms of implied illegal activities. This buys 
into the prejudiced stereotype of foreign nationals (especially Nigerians) as drug 
dealers and criminals. The statement that South Africa is ‘full of these people’ 
illustrates the media frenzy around a ‘flood’ or a ‘wave’ of immigrants, using 
natural metaphors of the influx being out of control (Danso & McDonald, 2000; 
Nyamnoh, 2006; Harris, 2002). While post-colonial nation-states have for a very 
long time received a steady flow of human, animal and vegetable migrants, the 
current alarm around their presence demonstrates an unprecedented collective 
panic (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001).  
 
Some learners therefore perceived foreign nationals in a pejorative light, linking 
their presence to criminality and a threat to ‘indigenous’ people’s prosperity. 
The notion of ‘blackness’ was understood in the context of the local Dunoon 
economy, whereby a certain group of people, who claim a history of struggling 
against apartheid, feel that they are enduring hardship- either through a lack of 
skills or due to illegitimate exploitation. Regardless of the truth of either of these 
scenarios, this group feel that they are being placed at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy. As the Dunoon councillor stated in an interview: 
Whereas we know we are Africans, coloureds, Indians, but now 
particularly, suffering people in South Africa is the blacks. For 
instance you can see next to here, you can see discrimination in the 
Western Cape still exist, you can go in one industry and count how 
many blacks inside. You will see two, three. The most is coloureds.     
 
This quote illustrates the interviewee’s connection between being ‘black’ and 
suffering and how this association is not, in the minds of many participants in 
this study, extended to other groups, for example coloured people. Some 
learners used this notion of economic deprivation linked to race to explain the 
outbreak of violence: 
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A: I think the xenophobia happened because of poverty. Because those 
people who are doing the xenophobia they are black people and they 
are living in poverty. 
The division of ‘us’- black , Xhosa people versus ‘them’- Somalis, is therefore 
largely constructed around who is suffering, the legitimacy of this suffering and 
how the contours of these identities are sculpted by the local, informal township 
economy. Commercial inequalities are seen in highly localised terms, such as 
the manner in which Somali shopkeepers, in Dunoon, have effectively undercut 
local businesses, through practices like collective stocking. The ruthless 
competition inherent in the township informal economy leads to frustrations and 
scapegoating, especially when those perceived to be ‘outsiders’ may have more 
skills, education and capital, than local people. Local notions of ‘blackness’ are 
understood within these urban social dynamics, with this racial identity 
associated with connotations of a lack of success, being poor and having limited 
access to skills and education. This has created resentment and bitterness 
amongst some South African citizens, such as many of the learners who 
participated in this study. These commercial dynamics are very public. As one 
enters Dunoon a line of shops appears, similar to an English high street, with 
luggage, electronic equipment, such as televisions, and clothes, being sold. This 
may create an illusion of the exaggerated wealth of foreign nationals and may 
explain why, in one study, 61% of South Africans said that foreign nationals 
should not be allowed to start small businesses (Crush, 2008). 
 
 
Young people in Dunoon aspire to be modern and 
urban 
 
The responses from the learners at Inkwenkwezi moved beyond racial and 
ethnic notions of identity, in the form of ‘we are blacks/Xhosas’, to a second 
main theme: these young people described ‘us’ as ‘modern, urban and 
consumers’. According to Chipkin (2007), values related to modernity are 
integral components of African nationalism, in general, which aims to attain a 
specific type of post-colony, one that transcends kinship, ethnicity and 
supernatural cosmology and is both urban and secular. In South Africa, 
liberation was not only based on ending apartheid, but on providing individuals 
with rights that allow one to function in a modern democratic state.  
 
This notion of an individual in a modern democratic state also informed the ‘we’ 
for the learners of Dunoon and the kind of life they envision themselves leading. 
All of the participants in the individual interviews came from the rural Eastern 
Cape, rendering them migrants in their own way.  They did not dismiss the 
Eastern Cape as an undesirable place, or deny the influence this region has had 
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on their development. However, the difference between Cape Town and the 
Eastern Cape is typified by: 
Over there it is the rural areas but over here it is some kind of citizen areas. 
Citizens have certain rights and responsibilities, as well as (supposedly) access 
to a specific kind of lifestyle. This lifestyle was alluded to in the participants’ 
descriptions of the advantages of being in Cape Town: 
I:  How is it different? 
S: Like, here in Cape Town, if I can think, people are coming here for 
business. People are coming here for jobs, there’s lots of places, 
(pause), lots of jobs, as much as they are taxis.  And, like, in Mtanzani, 
there not much places like there is in Cape Town. And in terms of 
money, and in terms of, the way I think, in Mtanzani, things are 
happening. Round hut, yeah. Yeah, (pause), in Transkei they live in 
rural areas, and then someway somehow they don’t have, uh, (pause), 
electricity, near water.  And even the taverns, there are not too much 
taverns in Transkei, and Mtanzani, as, as much as in Cape Town. In 
Cape Town, you see like, ah! This is the life, mos. Cause you feel like, 
you comes and enjoy yourself when you’re in Cape Town. In Transkei 
the thing that you are doing, you’re just following the cows there. Go 
with the cows, you take the cows and you go home, and in the 
morning, you do like one thing in the day. You see? Maybe after 
school, you go and do that. Tomorrow, it’s the same story. But then 
here, you go to school, maybe you go to play soccer some, sometimes. 
You go, maybe, you on the parties, like, go in these club, clubs. Go to 
clubs or you go do whatever. That’s why I do think there is a 
difference between Mtanzani, and, uh, Cape Town. 
 
Urban Cape Town is described as the epitome of modernity, a reservoir of 
employment, money, transport and opportunities that offer the potential for a 
better life. There is an assumption, in the response above, that once in Cape 
Town, one has sufficient income to engage in all of these recreational activities 
and that there are ample employment opportunities for the entire populace. 
Services, such as water and electricity, are apparently made readily available to 
people in urban areas, unlike their rural counterparts. The quality of life is 
therefore described as far superior in urban Cape Town. This is due to one’s 
income, opportunities, as well as a diversity of activities, venues and potential 
interactions with relevant others. By contrast, the rural Eastern Cape is described 
as a stagnant, agricultural environment, mundane and repetitive in its existence, 
with only livestock offered as company.  
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This city lifestyle described by the learners is accompanied by an urban culture 
based on rampant consumerism, restricted to certain elite spaces. For example, 
Cape Town’s many shopping malls were constantly referred to: 
M: like if we want to travel to the mall, we are going to take a taxi, it 
is easier to go there. When we are in Eastern Cape, we have to wait 
for special bakkies, so that you have to wait till that time, you know, 
so that if you miss that time you know that you are not going anywhere 
I: and why else do you think the people are happy in Dunoon? 
M: there are a lot of works, there many malls here (compared to 
Queenstown [in the Eastern Cape]).  They are going out in ...here in 
CT there are many towns, they are going Tableview, Century, but in 
Queenstown you have only the town 
I: So everyone goes to the mall? 
M: Yes 
I: What do they buy at the mall? 
M: Food. We are buying some chocolates, chips, or going to the 
movie and watching the movies. 
 
It would surely be much cheaper to remain in Dunoon and eat chips and 
chocolates, without having to pay for transportation to the mall. However, this 
would not fulfil the desire to be an individual in a modern industrial state, with 
all of the rights, freedoms and choices that are perceived to accompany this kind 
of society and are embodied by ‘the mall’. Dunoon is situated in the middle of a 
hub of shopping centres, including all of the northern suburbs malls, such as N1 
city, Tygervalley, Century city, as well as all of the malls in the Cape Town city 
centre. These spaces are therefore far more accessible for young people from 
Dunoon, than for township youth in Khayelitsha, Gugulethu or Langa. Young 
people from Dunoon describe these malls as exciting spaces, filled with all of 
the icons which are symbolic of wealth, prosperity and a middle-class lifestyle, 
far more desirable than the township, which is deemed to be dull and symbolic 
of the struggles of one’s parents.  
 
Similar findings have been documented elsewhere.  Nkuna (2006) states that 
although some shopping malls are dominated by values of rampant materialism 
and consumerism, young people still invest a considerable amount of interest in 
the meaning attached to different brands, images and products. There is also 
extensive social interaction in the mall, taking place in coffee shops and 
restaurants. Youth are not simply passive recipients of this lifestyle, they 
actively and, sometimes, consciously engage in this culture (Nkuna, 2006). 
Although Nkuna’s (2006) discussion pertains mainly to middle-class 
Johannesburg youth, interviews with township youth from Dunoon indicate that 
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these individuals may also use urban spaces, like the mall, to reconstruct 
themselves as modern, urban citizens in the new South Africa.  
 
Similarly, Bray et al (forthcoming, 2010) describe how, in mapping exercises, 
young people in Ocean View and Masiphumelele drew elaborate pictures of 
shopping malls, despite these places usually being fairly inaccessible to 
township youth. The shops were often named and painted in colours appropriate 
to their branding. These drawings were in stark contrast to the drawings of local 
neighbourhoods, which contained little detail and were usually coloured red to 
signify danger. Young people in Bray et al’s (forthcoming, 2010) study 
described making excuses, to their parents, in order to go to the mall, such as the 
need to check bank balances or run errands, and time at the mall whether 
shopping, window shopping or hanging out, was portrayed as highly enjoyable. 
The open economy and images projected by the media, in democratic South 
Africa, have therefore created a consumer culture where class differences are 
highly visible. Young people from poor neighbourhoods attempt to assuage 
these differences through lifestyle choices, purchasing commodities in the form 
of brands and labels and spending time in spaces like the mall, in order to obtain 
social inclusion.  
 
The urban lifestyle, observed in township youths’ descriptions of shopping 
malls, brands and commodities, is therefore perceived to be part of a process in 
which the ‘we’ are continually, urbanising, modernising and expecting to rise in 
status and quality of life: 
P: Yeah. Understanding South Africa is to know, like, why, are you, 
why do live at Western Cape? Why do people leave from Eastern 
Cape to Western Cape? Is to understand, like, the history of South 
Africa. Why are the people, why there is, there is white people living, 
like living in towns, living in places like Constantia, and we live in 
townships? If you know that and you understand that. Yeah. You, you 
know what is, you know what is South Africa. You have to know the 
life you used to live before you lived this life and the life you’re going, 
going to live in future. So, like, you understand South Africa, you are 
not going to complain, going to say nah, how can, how can I go to 
school, my parents don’t have money for me to go to tertiary levels. 
You’re going to give up easy on things but if you know, like, we 
coming from, we coming from a place where it was very harder than 
this. You can tolerate. Yeah.  
 
The Dunoon youths’ understanding of the process of urbanisation is based on a 
belief that things have improved- both from the perspective of apartheid’s 
demise and the fact that one is no longer located in the poverty stricken, rural, 
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Eastern Cape. This brings to mind the ruling ANCs slogan,” a better life for all”, 
implying that the new democratic state is associated with modern, urban living, 
for the entire populace. Migration to the Western Cape, and Cape Town in 
particular, is based on a belief that this move involves progress, in terms of 
one’s position in the social structure and quality of life. By contrast, the life that 
‘we’ lived before is described as a rural, ‘tribal’ existence and one that was 
based on oppression, within the apartheid regime.  
There is therefore a belief that although historical processes systematically 
restricted black people to rural areas, and townships, and kept places like 
Constantia, one of the most elite, lush, formerly white suburbs in Cape Town, 
reserved for white people, ‘we are moving towards Constantia’ . Constantia 
symbolises ‘the life you are going to live in the future’. The quote above implies 
that circumstances have improved and that this is a reason for motivation 
towards even further upward mobility. Tertiary level education is perceived to 
be a spring-board into a new urban, elite class and this may now be a realistic 
ambition for some township youth. To the youth quoted above, understanding 
‘South Africa’ means acknowledging the historical circumstances that have 
previously acted as a bulwark in our oppression. Concurrently, understanding 
the country also means believing that the future, for ‘us’, holds much promise. 
But this movement towards improved living conditions happens slowly and 
many people may begin to become frustrated with the pace of change, 
something of which the May 2008 attacks on foreign nationals are indicative. 
 
‘White’ people, unlike African foreign nationals, are seen as aiding this 
modernising project, an asset to ‘black’ people aspiring to enter this type of life: 
P: What are they (foreign nationals) bringing in SA? (Pause). Cause, 
like, they don’t have problem with white people, because white people 
they have, like, they’re civilizing, and they bringing new things, and 
new experiences in SA, and these people, these people are just doing 
their businesses. They’re hustling like black people, you know? So, 
they differ because they know they’re learning something from white 
people, and they don’t learn nothing from these people. They just 
losing something.  
I: What are they learning from white people? 
P: Yeah, cause they have, like, white people they all got business 
ideas, most of them. Someone comes from, comes from London with a 
business idea. He’s coming here to implement the idea and he’s 
employing people from townships. So, would you like your boss to go 
away if you were that person, working for that person? That’s why 
they not telling them to go. But these people, they just like them. If that 
person owns the business comes to the township, is looking for people, 
he’s taking these two South African people, and these Angolian two 
27 
people. Now, this other people who are South African people, like, 
who are not getting that job, they see that, no these people from these 
other countries, they are occupying our spaces from these people.  
I: What do you mean, that the white people have a civilizing… 
P: Yeah. Yeah. Before, before there were white people here in SA, we 
had no TVs. We had like no radios. There were no media. We didn’t 
know about businesses. Like selling things. We used to do tradings. If 
you have, if you, if you have a horse, I give you a horse, you give me a 
cow.  We used to do like that. But people now, if you have many, if you 
have many cows now, you can sell your cows. You don’t actually have 
to get a horse. So, like, white people brought things like selling, 
having cars, like, living in houses. Many things, cause like, civilization 
in Africa came here, came here with like, white people. (Pause). White 
people play a big part in civilization. I see you with this thing 
(pointing to interviewer’s digital voice recorder). I thought of buying 
this thing. See? I see you with a cell phone. We thought of buying cell 
phones. We see you white people with, uh, (pause) PDAs, now we 
have PDAs. With laptops, now we have laptops. With computers, we 
want computers. Because you see, when you see something that is 
useful, you cannot want something that you don’t know. So, the more 
people from other countries that come in here, in SA, the more we 
learn new, new things, and we get new things, new experiences. So, 
we civilizing.  
 
White people, many of whom are also migrants, are deemed to be part of this 
project of living as an individual in a modern industrial society (Nyamnjoh, 
2006). This is based on their apparent technological sophistication, corporate 
savvy and a form of intellectual development. These ‘white’ people may come 
from London or Cape Town, but they are perceived to be creating jobs- as 
opposed to using capital to exploit cheap labour- jobs which the learners said are 
being intercepted by African foreign nationals, such as Angolans. White people 
are assumed to be both a part of offering employment opportunities and in 
helping ‘us’ live the modern life that we desire. This is despite ‘white’ peoples’ 
abominable historical record in this regard, in the form of centuries of 
colonialism and decades of apartheid. 
 
On the other hand, African foreign nationals are ‘hustling’ like black people, 
meaning that they are struggling to survive and need to be quick, competitive 
and street-wise, in order to be successful. African foreign nationals often 
provide direct competition in terms of labour and, as multiple participants 
mentioned, many foreigners are even prepared to work for lower wages. Whilst 
innovative entrepreneurial practices by African foreign nationals, such as 
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collective stock purchasing, are dismissed as illegitimate, ‘white’ peoples’ use of 
labour and technology is interpreted as philanthropic. ‘Civilising’ has racist 
connotations from a colonial past, where Africa and its people were perceived to 
be ‘backward and barbaric’. However, this ‘civilising’ discourse fits with 
aspirations to urbanise and modernise that resonate with many township youth. 
These sentiments may have been exaggerated in an interview with a white 
interviewer and his electronic devices. However, it became apparent that these 
township youth identified with the lifestyle they perceived ‘white’ people to be 
living and not that of township-based foreign nationals and their ‘hustling’. 
 
The desire to become modern, urban citizens was apparent through the 
interviews and discussion groups, as depicted in the quotations above. This 
yearning was illustrated in the recreational activities and spaces described by 
learners, talk of where they have come from, their future ambitions and the 
lifestyle which they would like to live. Although many realise that these 
aspirations cannot be accomplished immediately, there is a belief that they will 
take place in the future. However, African foreign nationals are perceived to be 
hampering those ambitions, as they provide competition in terms of labour and 
they are apparently not aiding ‘us’ in attaining the life ‘we’ imagine living. 
 
 
Young people in Dunoon rationalise attacks through 
literal ‘hunger’: “they didn’t kill them they only took 
their food”.  
 
In this final analysis section I will explore how the themes from the two 
previous sections, that ‘we’ are simultaneously ‘black, Xhosa, modern, urban 
citizens’, relate to the attacks on Somali shopkeepers. Even though learners 
stated that the violent looting was due to a need for food, there is evidence, from 
the previous two themes, which indicates that the attacks were actually related to 
something more than simple ‘belly hunger’. This ‘hunger’ was also used 
metaphorically to infer that these youth are ‘hungry’ for a different life, one 
which includes all of the privileges inherent in a middle-class lifestyle and 
which, some of these learners feel, Somali shopkeepers are closer to attaining 
than themselves. It should be noted that in almost all of the discussion groups 
the learners condemned the negative attitudes and malicious actions towards 
foreign nationals. There was only one group in which participants verbally 
expressed that they thought foreigners should leave South Africa. However, the 
learners simultaneously explained the violence as understandable, due to ‘us’ 
being ‘black and suffering’. To reiterate a quote used earlier, one learner said: 
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A: I think the xenophobia happened because of poverty. Because those 
people who are doing the xenophobia they are black people and they 
are living in poverty. 
 
Although many respondents claimed that the urban life they lead is based on an 
abundance of employment, services and a consumer lifestyle, when asked why 
the conflict occurred, many stated that it was because of poverty and the fact 
that ‘people were hungry’. This contradiction: that Cape Town is described as 
both a hub of prosperity, as well as poverty-stricken, may indicate the difference 
between expectations and actual lived experiences. In other words, descriptions 
of Cape Town, as having an excess of employment, housing and services, may 
be based on expectations people have, especially when they arrive from, and in 
comparison to, the rural Eastern Cape. The learners’ description of Cape Town 
as a modern paradise, may therefore be based on an imaginary Cape Town, of 
which this cohort desire to be a part, as opposed to their daily lived realities. 
Alternatively, these discrepancies in portrayals of the city could also be due to 
the context of the description. ‘We live in poverty’ may be used to justify 
collective looting, whereas, in a different context, ‘we live in prosperity’ may be 
used to gain respect and dignity, especially in relation to a white interviewer.  
 
There was also a resounding belief, despite condemning the attacks, that what 
occurred in Dunoon was not ‘xenophobia’ or very serious, as foreigners were 
not physically hurt and they were ’allowed’ to return to Dunoon: 
 
Y: yes it was caused by hunger and I can support my statement. I 
recall here in Dunoon... I can’t remember any foreigner who was 
beaten, what I realised they were taking their things. After their things 
were finished they were released and it was not even a week they 
came back to Dunoon. If they wanted to kill the foreigner they would 
have done that. They didn’t want to kill them they only wanted their 
food. They did have a chance to kill them if they wanted to do so. They 




A: What is xenophobia 
B:  When you dislike someone whose from another country, it wasn’t 
about that, it wasn’t about like, people who come from Somalia and 
all that stuff...it was all about the food and stuff, cause they go into 
their shops and take their things. I think the real people to blame are 
our leaders, cause they should have came here to Dunoon and 
addressed the people , tried to calm them down you know.... I 
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wouldn’t say it was a strong dislike of people from other countries, 
it’s just poverty. I was part of those people who were against it. I 
wouldn’t call it xenophobia cause it wasn’t even close 
 
The actions taken by the ‘black, Xhosa’ people of Dunoon were often described 
as legitimate, based on their socio-economic circumstances. The learners 
explained that the conflict with foreign nationals was related to ‘food, hunger 
and poverty’ and these three words were mentioned repeatedly. Journalist 
Bronwynne Jooste, interviewing young men in Nyanga (one of Cape Town’s 
formal townships) found similar sentiments, as one young man said:  
    You must remember the people here they are poor, they are hungry. I saw 
them carrying all the meat and chicken out of the shops. Later that night we 
made a braai and ate it. It was a crime, yes, but that day was just a way for the 
people to get stuff they can’t buy themselves. (www.iol.co.za. 1 June 2008) 
 
Like in Nyanga, stealing food from foreign nationals’ shops, in Dunoon, was 
interpreted as a legitimate activity, considering ‘black’ people’s daily 
circumstances. Many participants felt that foreign nationals should feel grateful 
for being ‘spared’, as they ‘could have killed them if they wanted to’ and they 
were ‘released’. This rhetoric implies that foreign nationals do not automatically 
have rights and should feel fortunate to be granted certain liberties, liberties 
which citizens are assumed to possess. This illustrates the point that citizenship 
is not necessarily bestowed by the state or a set of legal statutes, but is 
negotiated in a diverse set of daily practices and places (von Lieres & Robins, 
2008).   
 
However, these actions that took place in Dunoon were not classified as 
‘xenophobia’ by the learners, a term that was associated with violence and 
verbalised hatred towards a specific group. It was often said that what happened 
in Johannesburg was ‘xenophobia’, but what happened in Dunoon, and Cape 
Town more generally, was far less serious, almost like a ‘joke’. It “wasn’t even 
close” to xenophobia, indicates the difference between what these respondents 
saw happening on television in Johannesburg, such as the most notorious image 
of one Mozambiquan man being burnt alive and what transpired in Dunoon. 
‘Xenophobia’ was condemned as unacceptable violence and hatred, whereas 
what happened in Dunoon was apparently justifiable, considering the socio-
economic circumstances in which ‘black Xhosa’ people live.  Simultaneously, 
participants always clarified that they personally condemn what happened in 
Dunoon.  
 
Even though the violence was not classified by locals as ‘xenophobia’ and was 
explained in terms of a need to eat, there appeared to be more to the attacks on 
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foreign nationals than a simple ‘pain in the stomach’. As has been mentioned, 
the soup kitchen in Dunoon was discontinued because people did not like the 
woman who ran it, learners asked me for coca-cola during interviews and not 
food and the streets of Dunoon are filled, in the evenings, with market stalls 
where people sell food. As one learner said: 
M: but they’re not hungry in that we need to eat now, now.  
I: Mmm. 
M: It’s because (pause) when they suffer financially, so most of them 
are like unemployed. Ok. What’s best for them to do is to like, do what 
they did. You know, to get what they want. Then it’s inevitable to get 
what they want. Which is not solving anything. (pause). Also, I think 
the (inaudible) of not employed, and eish, I also think, it also does 
affect that.  
 
The ‘hunger’ iterated by the learners is not completely encapsulated by a literal 
‘rumbling stomach’; it is also linked to perceptions of socio-economic 
circumstances that create ‘suffering’, stress, insecurity and disappointment for 
‘us’, while Somalis’ are perceived to enjoy a relatively comfortable lifestyle. 
The looting was described as a justified temporary alleviation of these 
circumstances. Although stealing is not perceived as a sustainable solution to the 
problem, it is assessed as a legitimate option at a given moment and the 
‘inevitability’ is linked to the security of knowing one can benefit from these 
actions and, to a degree, take control of one’s life. It is interesting that people 
did not fear law-enforcement agents. This may be due to the fact that looting of 
shops was carried out by groups and that some participants said police were 
complicit, and even participated, in the looting of foreign owned shops. But it is 
also indicative of the fact that the learners feel that the rights local people have, 
allows them to take from those whose status and situation is assessed to be 
illegitimately prosperous.  
 
The same participant expressed these socio-economic circumstances, which 
contributed to the conflict, in the following way in the discussion group: 
M: it’s more like the situation of poverty (giggles), no Somalian was 
killed, no Somalian was killed, you know that? They only took their 
food(laughs) their shops are like packed with rice and they can’t 
afford to buy their food and taxes are too much and prices are 
increasing and petrols and everything and the cost of living is getting 
higher and higher, the xenophobia is taking place in Joburg... they not 
really, they just taking things from Somalians, they didn’t hit one 
Somalian they only took their food (laughs).  
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They ‘only’ took their food illustrates the participant’s belief that the actions 
taken by the people of Dunoon were not malicious and are understandable when 
viewed from the context of the ‘poverty’ that is oppressing people and the rights 
to which these people should be entitled. The Somalis are also assessed as 
having excessive amounts of food, with their shops described as ‘packed’, 
meaning that they could spare some for the people who were starving. The 
conflict between the people of Dunoon and the foreign nationals is therefore 
understood as due to socio-economic circumstances and is not related to ‘hatred’ 
or genuine violence, which is dismissed as only occurring in far-off 
Johannesburg. ‘The people’ are vindicated in their actions, due to their difficult 
context. It was also felt that the Somalis were not completely innocent: 
 
People were reconciled with Somalians, people would sit down with 
them and talk to them about how they can handle their businesses... 
cause they did like they did contribute to the suffering of people 
owning businesses in our community. 
 
The business practices of the Somalis are described as part of the reason why 
people are poor and suffering, making it somewhat justifiable that the people of 
Dunoon stole from them. However, it was not only food that was stolen, nor was 
it only the Somalis who were looted: 
We were walking there seeing people. They were taking stuff from, 




So, we, I, I, I came here. When I go back there, I find, I find two shops 
(pause), near the taxi rank (pause) there’s people taking TVs, DVDs 
from Chinese shop.  
 
Although many learners responded that people were ‘hungry and living in 
poverty’, the situation is more complex than that, even if many people in 
Dunoon are very poor and do not have as much food as they would like. 
People’s actions were also shaped by a set of collective attitudes, as they stole 
electronic equipment, cellular telephone airtime and they stole from a range of 
foreign nationals, including Chinese owned shops. It was also clear that they 
were not simply going to sell these items, in order to buy food. As one boy said: 
C: Yes I wish I was there, because those people got what they got it 
was not said they should bring them back when the Somali’s got back. 




Young people in poor areas are aware of the way in which personhood is 
constructed for modern, urban, middle-class adolescents and they desire the 
objects, such as televisions, as well as the status and lifestyle, which comprise 
this ideal. These young people are hungry for a better life, one that includes all 
of the privileges that are part of middle-class living. It is the interaction of this 
‘poor urban imaginary’ and the relative deprivation that many of these citizens 
observe in the gap between the townships and suburbs like Constantia, which 
renders actions, like the looting of foreign owned shops, as justified in some 
poor people’s eyes. The people of Dunoon are by no means wealthy and their 
daily lives are a struggle, but it became clear, in the interviews, that this 
‘hunger’ of which the young people spoke, alluded to more than an instinctive 
need for food. This hunger also involved desires for what the urban poor feel it 
means to be a successful modern citizen, a lifestyle which is imbibed in 
televisions, laptop computers and airtime for cellphones. Although the looting of 
Somali shops was justified by descriptions of the need for food, this 
‘legitimising narrative’ is a vestibule which also holds a set of beliefs related to 
what groups of the urban poor feel that they deserve, especially in relation to 
others in their environments whose situation is deemed, in some circumstances, 





In this paper I have argued that, although many respondents stated that the 
attacks and looting carried out towards foreign nationals, in Dunoon, were the 
result of ‘hunger’, this need for food was used as a justification. Underneath and 
linked to this rhetoric were perceptions of inequality, in comparison to others in 
the immediate environment, as well as notions of citizenship related to social 
and economic rights assumed to be inherent in successful, modern, urban living. 
Integral to the manner in which young people legitimised the attacks and grapple 
with issues related to citizenship, were post apartheid understandings of 
‘blackness’, which were associated with inferior skills, wealth, education and 
prosperity, in relation to Somali shopkeepers. This was accompanied by 
descriptions of aspirations for a modern, middle class lifestyle. This combination 
of self-perceptions resulted in young people, in this study, justifying the attacks 
on Somali shopkeepers as wrong, but understandable due to the conditions in 
which urban ‘black’ people live. The way that young people in Dunoon 
understand themselves, where they are going and their material circumstances, 
therefore shapes both their notions of citizenship and their understanding of 
what is fair for different groups of people, in South Africa. These beliefs fuel 
resentment and produce notions of illegitimacy towards others in their local 
neighbourhood, who appear to be better off, such as Somali shopkeepers. The 
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fact that the research was conducted with teenagers, may result in these values 
related to ‘modernity’ being more pronounced, as they have grown up in a 
globalised South Africa, where the media ubiquitously projects images of 
selfhood based on consumerism, lifestyle and technology. Relative deprivation 
may be experienced more acutely by this cohort. This is because teenagers from 
poor communities are hampered in their ambitions to attain adult-like 
individuality and independence, in comparison to middle-class teenagers, with 
more material resources.  
 
The case study of Dunoon, and the events which transpired in this community 
illustrate how a disjunction may exist between ‘formal citizenship’- membership 
within South Africa and ‘substantive citizenship’- comprised of political, civil, 
socio-economic and cultural rights, for groups of poor South Africans, in the 
post-apartheid period. Although citizens are afforded political rights in new 
democracies, citizenship extends beyond these liberties. It includes participation 
in social and economic life. Caldeira & Holston (1999) argue that this 
disjunction occurs fairly commonly and can be observed in the new democracies 
of Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa. In some cases, groups 
within these countries may claim rights through productive social movements. 
Holston (2007) has argued that concurrent with urbanisation, beginning in the 
1970s, the Brazilian working class forged new forms of ‘insurgent citizenship’ 
through ‘autoconstruction’: rebuilding parts of urban peripheries in the form of 
houses, neighbourhoods and urban life. In so doing this group confronted 
historically entrenched forms of citizenship which maintained inequality, 
reclaiming participation and rights. However, the claiming of these substantive 
rights may not always occur through a process which produces inclusivity. The 
disjunction between formal and substantive citizenship may produce a response 
that enhances exclusivity, in the form of reactionary local movements, such as 
‘xenophobia’ (Holston & Appadurai, 1999). In this paper I have explored how a 
negative form of insurgent citizenship, in the form of attacks on Somali 
shopkeepers, was related to relative deprivation and a lack of substantive 
citizenship.  
 
The lack of substantive citizenship is further illustrated by the complaints in 
Appendix A and the fact that according to census data from 2001, 86% of 
Dunoon residents earned less than R1600 per month. While all South Africans 
have been granted formal citizenship, as described in the constitution, the social 
and economic rights which were assumed to accompany this form of citizenship 
have been elusive for many poor South Africans. Citizenship is not linear, 
cumulative or evenly distributed, it is always a disjunctive mix. People may, in 
theory, have certain rights in the new South Africa, but they often feel socially 
and economically deprived, which may easily result in resentment and violence 
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towards those deemed to be ‘outsiders’, (Nyamnjoh, 2006). Part of a society’s 
ability to make a success of democracy is related to the structural conditions that 
accompany that democracy (Dixon, 2004). South Africa has struggled to 
transform the structural inequalities that existed under apartheid. These 
inequalities continue to maintain huge differences in the distribution of wealth. 
Whilst certain groups may be understanding of these inequalities, because 
redistribution is assumed to take time, a lack of substantive citizenship may 
simultaneously produces scapegoats, such as Somalian shopkeepers in Dunoon 
and other Africans fighting to survive. In this light, Xenophobia, defined as “the 
intense dislike, hatred or fear of those perceived to be strangers”, explains as 
much as it is explained, by relative deprivation, economic inequality and the 
‘modern imaginary’ of what it means to be a respectable citizen (Nyamnjoh, 
2006). 
 
This form of disjunctive citizenship, which contributes towards an obsession 
with ‘natives’ and ‘foreigners’, is not restricted to the South African context. 
The conflict between South African citizens and African foreign nationals needs 
to be seen in global terms. Other new democracies in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa display similar disjunctions and phenomena such as Eastern European 
immigrants moving westwards, 9/11 and United States-Mexico border crossings, 
demonstrate global tensions around inequality, capital/labour paradoxes, fear of 
‘outsiders’ and the ambiguous role of the nation-state. There is, therefore, a need 
to understand the broader situation of global citizenship, Africa globalising and 
globalisation on Africa, to properly come to grips with the conflict between 
South African citizens and foreign nationals (Nyamnjoh, 2006). The downside 
to these effects of globalisation are contained in increased competition between 
poor people for menial jobs and the way this friction produces claims to 
‘ethnicity’, nationality and privileges, which may result in bitter struggles. 
However, the learners in this study also hint at some of the benefits to a new 
South Africa, in a global community: 
 
H: You see, mos, if maybe somehow there is Beyoncẽ (African-
American pop star Beyonce Knowles), that she wants to come here, in 
South Africa. Maybe someway somehow, she’s going to be afraid to 
come here. That thing that happened to the Xenophobia thing, like, 
(pause). “What if I go to South Africa, like and put, maybe I put my 
BMW in South Africa. Maybe these guys in South Africa, the black 
guys will take that, will take that BMW of mine, and say that, and say 
that I’m a kwerekwere”. I think of 2010. 2010 is around the corner, 
mos, and someway somehow, there are maybe kwerekweres that are 
playing soccer. So that kwerekwere is going to be afraid to come in 
South Africa to play soccer. (pause). Cause they’ll be these plenty 
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people coming from all over the world: Nigeria, America, ya bo? Ettò 
(Ghana and Barcelona football star Emmanual Etto) is going to be 
afraid to come in South Africa, cause he sees that there are people 
that are beaten here in South Africa, so how can I go in South Africa, 
cause, he won’t, he won’t feel free as usual. Let me say, maybe, 
Zinadine Zidan, or Ettò, or Ronaldo, they gonna be afraid to come to 
South Africa, cause they see that, ah, South Africa, it seems that it’s a 
bad country, cause, cause there this thing that the South Africa has 
done. Maybe, there is this house of orphans here in South Africa, nẽ? 
Maybe there is a guy who is living overseas. He wants to come here, 
and give, and give sponsor maybe for these child that are, do not have 
parents, you see? Somehow he will think that: “oh. South Africa is 
such a kind of a country that is doing this and that, and that, and that. 
So, what’s the use of me taking my money and giving to South Africa 
while South Africa is doing that”? 
 
Globalization has also opened up channels for people to acknowledge their 
shared humanity, through common interests, such as music, sport and child-
rearing (even if these interests are sometimes in the form of the desire for luxury 
German vehicles, American music or English soccer clubs). Although the 
learner continually uses the pejorative term ‘kwerekwere’, he is grappling with 
what it means for South Africa to exist on the world stage, in a context where 
South Africans’ reputations are accountable to their domestic activities. A 
human-rights discourse, one that acknowledges the universality of dignity and 
condemns abuses of  liberty and individual freedoms, is an important 
mechanism through which to assuage some of the abuses people have 
historically endured. However, this human-rights discourse needs to be 
accompanied by an inclusive notion of global citizenship, one which has access 
to the practices, social interactions, resources and privileges, usually reserved 
for an elite few.  
 
This is not to condone prejudice or proclaim that the May attacks are 
understandable when considering the circumstances which prevail. A minority 
of South Africans was involved in these atrocities and many have spoken out 
against those who participated. However, ‘xenophobia’, implying a pathological 
phenomenon, one distinct from an otherwise healthy body politic and 
understood to be ‘an irrational fear of strangers’, is not a particularly 
comprehensive, all-inclusive concept. In some ways, the term xenophobia ‘gets 
them asking the wrong questions, so they don’t have to worry about the 
answers’. A question, which I think is more relevant, is asked by Suren Pillay: 
What form of politics might we be seeing unfold in the corporatized 
identity given to those who have participated in the violence of May, 
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those who have been described as ‘hooligans’, ‘marauding mobs’ and 
‘barbarians’? (Pillay, 2008) 
 
The answer to this question is contained in the paradoxes of citizenship with 
rights but not rewards, democracies that are only partially democratic, identities 
which are exclusive, but also temporarily manufactured, spaces that are 







To: The City of Cape Town 
 
From: The Community of Dunoon and Site 5. 
 
Attention: The Mayor of the City of Cape Town 
 
• We the people living in shacks, in Dunoon and Site 5 are demanding Houses. Since 2001, The 
City of Cape Town has never built a single house for this Community and shacks are 
increasing everyday. We are living in unbearable conditions. 
• In most cases there is no sanitation and we have to use near-by bushes to relieve ourselves and 
therefore all our surroundings are filthy and stinking. 
• We are affected by deceases and it is worse with over children. 
• Winter is approaching we will be living in unbearable weather conditions, mud, water and 
cold conditions. 
• We live in overcrowded conditions without any privacy. 
• We live in fear of fires that destroy the fen belongings we have. 
• Our shack areas become hiding places for criminals and we get killed and robber everyday. 
• We cannot raise, build and project our families under these conditions. 
• Living in such conditions that we cannot have access to services that can improve the quality 
of our lives e.g. clean water, sanitation, roads, lighting, proper health services and many more. 
• No human being deserves to live in such conditions. We have been sentenced to live in hell by 
our own government. 
 
2. Dunoon is a health hazard – The streets are dirty, refuse collections is a disaster. Drains 
bursting with faeces floating in the streets is a daily occurrence, flies and maggots crawling all 
over the place has become part of our lives, the whole township is filthy and stinking. These 
conditions are a breeding ground for all types of diseases. We are been sentenced to death by 
lack of adequate basic services. General Dunoon is overpopulated and our infrastructure 
cannot accommodate this situation. 
 
3. Our Small clinic cannot accommodate the needs of our Community. It is too small and 
understaffed. We need a Day Hospital with adequate equipment, facilities and staff. Mothers 
give birth in Ambulances or homes, people die on their way to Somerset Hospital, old and sick 
people have to travel long distances to the nearest Health Facilities outside Dunoon. This is 
not acceptable. 
 
4. Phase one in Dunoon does not have drains – We draw dirty water from our kitchens with 
buckets and pour it in drains or in the streets. The effects of that is obvious. This causes a 
breeding space for flies and germs and at times the blockage of storm water drains. We do not 
have play places, our children play in the streets and they end up picking up these germs. 
 
5. We need a Community Centre – We do not have a Community Centre where we can do 
various Projects like, 
• Indoor Sport Activities 
• Choirs, Soup kitchens 
• Community Resource Centre 
• Sewing, Knitting, Bead making etc... 
Many NGOs and CBs want to service the Community of Dunoon – But they do not have 
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